Political Dissent by Early American Covenanters

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“John Ploughman says, Of two evils choose neither. Don't choose the least, but let all evils alone.” — Charles Spurgeon, The Salt-Cellars: Being a Collection of Proverbs, Together with Homely Notes Thereon (1889), p. 297

“...instead of being fixed by their favourite poster, 'of two evils choose the least,' I say,... when you give me the choice of two moral evils, I can choose neither of them. If I have the choice of two physical evils, I will choose the least. If I am asked whether I would choose to lose a toe or a leg, I would choose to part with a toe; but if I am asked whether I would desecrate the Sabbath by steam or by horse power, I say I would do neither. There is a dangerous and deadly fallacy lurking beneath this common maxim, against which I would warn all; for of two moral evils we must choose neither — we are not at liberty to do evil that good may come.” — William Symington, Speech of the Rev. Dr. Symington at the great meeting, for protesting against the desecration of the Sabbath by the running of trains on the Edinburgh and Glasgow railway on the Lord's day, held in the City Hall, Glasgow, February 26, 1842

“There is one political maxim that comforts me: ‘The Lord reigns.’” — John Newton, Letter III to Mrs. P., August 1775

When the Testimony of the Reformed Presbyterian Church in America (RPCNA) was adopted in 1806 (published in 1807 under the title Reformation Principles Exhibited), a full chapter was included on the subject, in addition to the one on civil government, concerning “the right of Dissent from a Constitution of Civil Government.” Because American Covenanters view the scope of Christ’s dominion as King to include all things — nations as well as the church — they historically considered it sinful to omit (as the U.S. Constitution does) allegiance to him as King (Ps. 2:10-12). And further, oaths such as that required of elected officials (and often voters) by the same Constitution were consequently considered unlawful.

William Gibson, one of the early Covenanter ministers in America, who was involved in the preparation of Reformation Principles Exhibited, had in fact fled Ireland because of his refusal to swear an oath of allegiance to the government during the Irish Rebellion of 1797. Alexander McLeod, author of Messiah, Governor of the Nations of the Earth — a classic statement of Covenanter doctrine concerning the Mediatorial Kingship of Christ over all things — wrote about political dissent in the historical section of the RP Testimony. These men, as well as James Renwick Willson, Samuel B. Wylie and others, were confronted early on with issues of what it meant to be a loyal, patriotic civic-minded American citizen in the newly-formed republic of the United States of America.

For many Covenanters — and abolitionists in general, such as William L. Garrison, who described the U.S. Constitution as “a covenant with death and an agreement with hell” — the founding charter of this country, rather than manifesting Biblically-required submission to the laws of Christ, mandated sinful involvement by all who voted or swore oaths of allegiance to a document that exalted “We, the people” at the expense of Christ’s honor, and positively required endorsement of, a system that upheld the wicked practice of enslaving human beings. Thus, early American Covenanters declined to vote, or serve on juries, or to participate in any political activity that required them to sanction the political process as it then existed.

Even after the War Between the States — or, the “Late Rebellion” as it was termed by some — political dissent was viewed as a crucial aspect of Covenanter testimony to the claims of the Lord Jesus Christ upon America. It was not until the 1960’s that the doctrine of political dissent was dropped as a term of communion within the RPCNA. The current RP Testimony allows for voting in American civil elections if candidates meet certain criteria involving fidelity to Christian moral and doctrinal standards. However, a consistent application of the even current standard teaching of the RPCNA would prohibit a Covenanter from voting for most (all?) candidates standing for the 2020 election, if principle rather than pragmatism holds sway.

At the heart of this historic dissent from political activity in America is not an Anabaptistic rejection of all involvement in civil affairs. Covenanters confess (see the Westminster Confession of Faith chap. 23) that civil government is a good and needful ordinance of God. Their political activity in American history with regard to opposition to slavery (and other current forms of legal but immoral conduct such as Sabbath-breaking and abortion), is well-documented (see Joseph S. Moore, Founding Sins: How a Group of Antislavery Radicals Fought to Put Christ into the Constitution). The concern of Covenanters for godly civil government has always been at the forefront of their core convictions; so much so that their unpopular stand regarding political dissent has led them to suffer persecution for their unwillingness to embrace American political ideals. James R. Willson was once burned in effigy after he published Prince Messiah's Claims to Dominion Over All Governments; and the Disregard of His Authority by the United States, in the Federal Constitution (1832). Covenanters have historically considered it a noble and worthy sacrifice to decline to avail themselves of the political privilege of voting as long as the oath of allegiance to the U.S. Constitution is a part of the process of the elective franchise. But these were the same body of people who — beginning with Alexander Craighead, who was the first Presbyterian in America to publicly justify armed rebellion against Great Britain in 1743, and whose principles inspired the 1775 Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence — were front and center in the fight for American Independence, and in the fight for freedom for American slaves. Their desire for reformation encompassed both church and state.

Much more could be said about the Covenanter principle of political dissent, but to read them in their own words, it is helpful to consult the following:

• Thomas Houston Acheson, Why Covenanters Do Not Vote (1912) - In this brief two-part article, Acheson gives six reasons that are NOT the reason why Covenanters do not vote; his six-fold reason why Covenanters do not vote; and the response to twelve objections to the Covenanter position.

• George Alexander Edgar, The Reformed Presbyterian Catechism (1912) - In this catechism of RP principles (a reprise of Roberts’ 1853 catechism cited below), it is taught that nations and their constitutions are morally accountable before God, and that Christians therefore have a duty to dissent from immoral constitutions.

• Finley Milligan Foster, What Voting Under an Unchristian Constitution Involves (n.d.) - This tract sketches the basic arguments of Covenanters that the U.S. Constitution is immoral, the act of voting involves acceptance of an immoral constitution, and that such is a sin against the King of the nations.

• James Mitchell Foster, Shall We Condemn the Aggravated Guilt of This Nation in Vitiating the Consciences of its Christian Citizens by Requiring Them to Swear Allegiance to the Secular Constitution of the U.S. as the Condition of Exercising Their Political Privileges in the Governing Body? (1909) — No summary is needed after reading the title.

• William Melancthon Glasgow, History of the Reformed Presbyterian Church in America - Political dissent is a recurring theme throughout Glasgow’s standard history of the denomination.

• Nathan Robinson Johnston, “Political Dissent” (1892) - This is a letter to the editor of the Christian Instructor, reprinted in Political Dissenter, which responds to an article critiquing the Covenanter position on political dissent. Johnston responds to several points made by the author of that article in defense of political dissent.

• James Calvin McFeeters, The Covenanters in America: The Voice of Their Testimony on Present Moral Issues (1892) - This testimony by McFeeters includes a chapter on “The Covenanters and Political Dissent.”

• Alexander McLeod, Reformation Principles Exhibited (1807) - As mentioned above, this first Testimony of the RPCNA contains an historical section as well as a doctrinal outline, both of which articulate a position of political dissent from constitutions which omit and oppose allegiance to Christ.

• John Wagner Pritchard, Soldiers of the Church: The Story of What the Reformed Presbyterians (Covenanters) of North America, Canada, and the British Isles, Did to Win the World War of 1914-1918 (1919) - This volume, of which we have written before, examines the contributions of RP members to the war effort in World War I in light of the issue of the usual requirements of soldiers to swear an oath of allegiance to their government. He writes: "People who do not understand, marvel that a Covenanter will give his life for his country but withholds his vote at election time. A Covenanter will give his life because of his loyalty to his country, and withholds his vote at election time because of his loyalty to Christ. To become a soldier he is required to swear loyalty to his country, and that he is always eager to do; but to vote at an election he is required to swear to a Constitution of Civil Government that does not recognize the existence of God, the authority of Christ over the nation, nor any obligation to obey His moral law; and that his conception of loyalty to Christ will not permit him to do."

• William Louis Roberts, The Reformed Presbyterian Catechism (1853) — In this catechism of RP principles, “The right and duty of dissent from an immoral constitution of civil government” is identified as one of the twelve distinctive teachings of the RPCNA.

• James McLeod Willson, Bible Magistracy; or, Christ's Dominion Over the Nations (1842) - After sketching fundamental principles of civil government and Christ’s Kingship over the nations, Willson applies those principles to the situation in the United States and affirms the need for political dissent.

• James Renwick Willson, Prince Messiah's Claims to Dominion Over All Governments; and the Disregard of His Authority by the United States, in the Federal Constitution (1832) - This is perhaps the most detailed critique of the U.S. Constitution and its flaws from the Covenanter perspective.

• Richard Cameron Wylie, Dissent From Unscriptural Political Systems (1896) - An address delivered at the First International Convention of Reformed Presbyterian Churches, held in Scotland, outlines reasons why Covenanters held to the doctrine of political dissent.

Although the doctrine of political dissent from immoral constitutions is not widely understood or accepted today among Christians and even among some Reformed Presbyterians, it is helpful to consider what early Covenanters believed in this country concerning involvement in civil affairs. There are some today who may abstain from voting because of indifference or apathy; those Covenanters did so out of a deep abiding conviction that Christ must be honored in the halls of government and at the ballot box. In this election year, it is worth pondering those convictions in the light of Scripture, and seeking to understand whether these principles remain relevant. There are many avenues to reformation, but the means as well as the end must be able to stand in the light of God’s word in order for a nation to be blessed. As A.A. Hodge (not a Covenanter, but a vice-president of the National Reform Association) said:

In the name of your own interests I plead with you; in the name of your treasure-houses and barns, of your rich farms and cities, of your accumulations in the past and your hopes in the future, — I charge you, you never will be secure if you do not faithfully maintain all the crown-rights of Jesus the King of men. In the name of your children and their inheritance of the precious Christian civilization you in turn have received from your sires; in the name of the Christian Church, — I charge you that its sacred franchise, religious liberty, cannot be retained by men who in civil matters deny their allegiance to the King. In the name of your own soul and its salvation; in the name of the adorable Victim of that bloody and agonizing sacrifice whence you draw all your hopes of salvation; by Gethsemane and Calvary, — I charge you, citizens of the United States, afloat on your wide wild sea of politics, There is Another King, One Jesus: The Safety Of The State Can Be Secured Only In The Way Of Humble And Whole-souled Loyalty To His Person and of Obedience His Law (Popular Lectures on Theological Themes, p. 287).

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The Place of Conscience in the Life of a Christian: Samuel J. Cassels

It was Jiminy Cricket who said, "Always let your conscience be your guide." This is good advice if our conscience is informed and ruled by the Word of God. However, if our conscience is ignorant of Scripture or has been seared or hardened by repeated sin, then Jiminy Cricket theology is disastrous. — R.C. Sproul, Sr., Essential Truths of the Christian Faith, p. 151

Just two months before his death at the age of 47, Samuel Jones Cassels contributed an article to The Southern Presbyterian Review (Vol. 6, no. 4, April 1853) titled “Conscience - Its Nature, Office and Authority.” This is a valuable study of an important topic that Christians continue to struggle with today. By reviewing selections from Archibald Alexander’s Outlines of Moral Science, John Dick’s Lectures on Theology, James McCosh’s The Method of the Divine Government, and Thomas Brown’s Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Cassels lays out an argument concerning what the conscience is and its place of authority with respect to divine revelation.

Cassels affirms that the conscience is “that faculty or power of the human soul by which it perceives the difference between right and wrong, approving the one and condemning the other. In this definition, two things are to be observed: first, conscience is a mental power or faculty, the same as the reason, the will, or the memory.” However, the question arises, when the conscience is misinformed or seared, what is the case of a Christian in such a situation? Cassels responds thus (pp. 465-469):

We come now to what we consider the most difficult part of this discussion; and the more so, because we are compelled to differ from some of those excellent Divines with whom we have heretofore so heartily agreed. When we speak of the authority of conscience, we are apt to be misled by the language. Authority is exercised by kings, magistrates, officers and parents. It supposes an intelligent ruler, a system of laws, and rational subjects. But when we apply this term to a mental faculty, we must certainly exclude from it all these accessory ideas of regular human administration. And yet, even metaphysicians discoursing upon the mere powers or capacities of the human mind, employ a sort of court-language, as if they were describing the administration of some great monarch. This is a great fault, especially with Mr. McCosh, whose vivid imagination seems always ready to give a scenic representation to mental processes.

That the different mental faculties have distinct offices, and that each one either does or ought to predominate in its specific sphere, will be readily admitted. Reason is supreme in all abstract truth; the will on all matters of choice; the emotions in all objects of affection; the imagination in the province of fancy; and the conscience in the domain of morals. Now, each of these mental faculties does and must take the lead in its particular field of operation. Yet, as our consciousness will testify, most of our actions are the results of not one only, but of several of these mental powers. Indeed, the relation between these mental faculties is so intimate, that in most cases the action of the one must take place before the action of another can exist. All then, that we can mean by the authority of a mental power, is simply its precedence over the rest in any one action. And all that we can mean by the obedience, or subjection of one mental faculty to another, is simply the posteriority of its operation. Reason asserts that a certain abstract proposition is true; at once the will and the heart concur in the conclusion. The proposition was addressed to the reason, and its decision must be, of course, that of the entire mind or soul. At another time, an object may be presented to the emotion of love. The point now'to be decided is, shall such an object or person be loved? If the case be a doubtful one, the reason may again be called upon to do its office: that, is, to compare, judge, decide, etc. In other cases, however, the heart overleaps the tardy work of reason, and responds at once to the object, as soon as presented. Shall a mother love her babe? It is not her intellect, but her heart that solves that question. The same is true of the conscience. — Where a question of morality admits of doubt, the reason may be called in, and may be long employed in its investigations before the conscience is prepared to act. But in all obvious cases, this faculty acts instantly, and approves or disapproves of a certain act as soon as perceived. There are obviously then a precedence and a sequence in mental operations. But when we transcend this beautiful order in which the mental faculties operate, and establish, within the soul a sort of spiritual administration, with all the paraphernalia of courts and palaces, we evidently use language very loosely, and are in danger of being misled altogether in reference to the mind and its powers.

With these explanations, we proceed to consider the question at issue: Is a man bound to follow his conscience when its judgments are erroneous? That the real point of debate may be understood, we give the following quotations from Drs. Dick and Alexander: — “ An appeal” says the former, “may always be made from its (conscience) decisions to the word of God, and as soon as a difference is discovered between its dictates and those of Scripture, the sentence which it has pronounced is void. Hence it is plain, that the plea of conscience will not be admitted to exempt us from guilt and punishment. And this, we may observe, is the unhappy situation of those whose consciences are not sufficiently enlightened; that they sin, whatever they do; in disregarding the voice of conscience, and in obeying it.” Dr. Alexander maintains the same position: — “It is true, if a man’s conscience dictates a certain action, he is morally bound to obey; but if that action be wrong, he commits sin in performing it nevertheless. He, who is under fundamental error, is in a sad dilemma. Do what he will, he sins. If he disobey conscience, he knowingly sins ; doing what he believes to be wrong; and if he obey conscience, performing an act which is in itself wrong, he sins; because he complies not with the law under which he is placed.” Now, as much as we esteem the sentiments of the authors above quoted, we must think they have both fallen into error on this subject. This will appear from the fact, that they have here introduced two opposite rules of conduct, each of which the subject is bound at the same time to obey. The law of God dictates one course; and the law of conscience another, directly opposite. To each of these laws a man is morally bound to submit. Now, it is evident, that a man can no more obey two such opposite rules at the same time, than that he can occupy two places at the same time, or than he can both love and hate the same object at the same time. The thing is impossible, and therefore cannot be a matter of moral obligation. The same difficulty is also seen when we consider the moral qualities of the action: it is both right and wrong — worthy of reward and also worthy of punishment! Now, a human action cannot possess two qualities so diametrically opposite. As the same object cannot be white and black at the same time, so the same moral act cannot be both virtuous and vicious.

The errors in these statements, as we conceive, are two fold. The one consists in giving conscience a supremacy which does not belong to it; the other in blending two distinct moral acts, and ascribing a common moral character to them, as if they were one. Conscience is neither a moral governor, nor a moral law. It is a faculty of the soul, fitting man for a moral government existing, not within, but without him. God is our only true moral governor, and his will is our only supreme moral law. Our subjection then, is not to be a subjection to conscience, (which, being a part of ourselves, would imply subjection to ourselves,) but a subjection to God, as our moral governor. The very moment we set up conscience as a sort of rival to Jehovah, that moment we become idolaters, and sacrifice our real liberty. The care is very much that of the Papist, who is perfectly satisfied that when he has heard his priest he has heard his God; and that when he stands well with his priest, he also stands well in the court of Heaven. Now, to exalt the conscience into any such high position, and to obey its dictates with the full assurance that they must be right, is but to deify a faculty of the human soul, and to fall down in worship to ourselves. Man is a moral agent, possessed of certain mental faculties, all of which are designed to aid him in the prosecution of a virtuous course of conduct. But he is depraved; and there is not a mental faculty that is not erroneous in its operations. The reason is more or less blind, the will is perverse, the passions are deranged, and the conscience is dull, inefficient and easily perverted. This condition of the human soul is taught us by experience, observation and scripture. For a man, then, to trust himself to the dictates of any one of his faculties, or of all of them combined, is necessarily to hazard the peace and well-being of his soul. The decisions of conscience in many cases are just as much to be held in doubt, as those of the reason. And in attempting to ascertain our duty in such cases, we are not to consult, but to instruct our consciences. We must take the conscience itself to the revealed will of God, and there, and there only, obtain that light which is to guide us in the path of duty. Now, when this course is honestly and faithfully pursued, it is next to impossible that the conscience should be in “fundamental error.” To suppose so, is to suppose either that the Bible does not adequately reveal the will of God, or that man is incapable of understanding that will when so revealed.

But our theologians will tell us, that the case supposed is that of one who has done all this, and is still in error. He has examined the Scriptures prayerfully and honestly, and has conscienciously come to certain conclusions, both as to its doctrines and precepts. Still those conclusions are erroneous. Now, in such a case, we say without hesitation, that such a man is bound to receive, as God’s revealed truth, that which, after such examination, he conceives to be such. But this is not subjection to con science, but to God. Faith is here placed, not in the decisions merely of a mental faculty, but in the infallible teachings of the Holy Ghost. That such a man should err as to the essentials of the Gospel, is improbable in the last degree; that he should mistake on some of its minor points, is very likely. We cannot conceive, however, that such mistakes should vitiate his obedience. Errors in religion, when they arise from carelessness, prejudice, pride of intellect, or any other like cause, are certainly,criminal. But those errors, which even the best men are liable to make on this subject, and which arise from causes beyond their control, can certainly never inculpate them in the sight of God.